Notes on Nietzsche’s Critique of Descartes' Cogito

… [I feel that] it is necessary to know what doubt is, and what thought is, [what existence is], before we can be fully persuaded of this reasoning — I doubt, therefore I am — or what is the same — I think, therefore I am. (René Descartes, Inquisitio Veritatis per Lumen Naturale).^[1]

“There are still harmless observers of themselves who believe that there are "immediate certainties," for example, "I think," or that superstition of Schopenhauer's, "I will," just as if perception here was able to seize upon its object pure and naked, as "thing in itself," and as if there was no falsification either on the part of the subject or on the part of the object. However, the fact is that "immediate certainty," just as much as "absolute cognition" and "thing in itself," contains within itself a contradictio in adjecto [contradiction in terms]. I'll repeat it a hundred times: people should finally free themselves of the seduction of words! Let folk believe that knowing is knowing all of something. The philosopher must say to himself, "When I dismantle the process which is expressed in the sentence 'I think,' I come upon a series of daring assertions whose grounding is difficult, perhaps impossible - for example, that I am the one who thinks, that there must be some general something that thinks, that thinking is an action and effect of a being which is to be thought of as a cause, that there is an 'I', and finally that it is already established what we mean by thinking - that I know what thinking is. For if I had not yet decided these questions in myself, how could I assess that what just happened might not perhaps be 'willing' or 'feeling'?" In short, this "I think" presupposes that I compare my immediate condition with other conditions which I know in myself in order to establish what it is. Because of this referring back to other forms of "knowing," it certainly does not have any immediate "certainty" for me. Thus, instead of that "immediate certainty," which the people may believe in the case under discussion, the philosopher encounters a series of metaphysical questions, really essential problems of intellectual knowledge, as follows: "Where do I acquire the idea of thinking? Why do I believe in cause and effect? What gives me the right to speak of an 'I,' and indeed of an 'I' as a cause, finally even of an 'I' as the cause of thinking?" Anyone who dares to answer those metaphysical questions right away with an appeal to some kind of intuitive cognition, as does the man who says "I think and know that at least this is true, real, and certain"- such a person nowadays will be met by a philosopher with a smile and two question marks. "My dear sir," the philosopher will perhaps give him to understand, "it is unlikely that you are not mistaken but why such absolute truth?"” (Friedrich Nietzsche - Beyond Good and Evil, Part I - Aphorism # 16) ^[2]

• In saying "I think," one implicitly makes several substantive metaphysical claims about the nature of "I" that go beyond the mere occurrence of thought. None of these assumptions follow simply from the undeniability of thought itself. It implies that it can be known with certainty that “I” am the one who thinks, that there must be some general something that thinks, that thinking is an action and effect of a being which is to be thought of as a cause, that there is an “I”, and finally that it is already established what we mean by thinking - that “I” know what thinking is and that what is happening is not something that is, say, “willing” or “feeling.” These claims, for Nietzsche, are neither self-evident nor immediately given.
• Due to this, the supposed “certainty” of the cogito falls apart. What seems like a stable and indisputable foundation is revealed to actually be dependent on several contentious claims and interpretations. The cogito raises a series of metaphysical questions: "Where do I acquire the idea of thinking? Why do I believe in cause and effect? What gives me the right to speak of an “I,” and indeed of an “I” as a cause, finally even of an “I” as the cause of thinking?"
• Thus, against Descartes, Nietzsche argues that the cogito does not secure the existence of a substantial ego, an “I.” One cannot jump from the statement "there is a thought" to the idea that "I am thinking" and therefore the rest of the cogito, "I am" cannot follow. One cannot even draw the conclusion from the presence of a thought that “there is thinking” or “it thinks” because even that implies that there is a metaphysical object engaging in the act of thinking and that thinking is an act. A thought occurring, in conclusion, proves nothing more than the existence of a thought.

"So far as the superstitions of the logicians are concerned, I will never tire of emphasizing over and over again a small brief fact which these superstitious types are unhappy to concede - namely, that a thought comes when "it" wants to and not when "I" wish, so that it's a falsification of the facts to say that the subject "I" is the condition of the predicate "think." It thinks: but that this "it" is precisely that old, celebrated "I" is, to put it mildly, only an assumption, an assertion, in no way an "immediate certainty." After all, we've already done too much with this "it thinks": this "it" already contains an interpretation of the event and is not part of the process itself. Following grammatical habits we conclude here as follows: "Thinking is an activity. To every activity belongs someone who does the action, therefore -." With something close to this same pattern, the older atomists, in addition to the "force" which created effects, also looked for that clump of matter where the force was located, out of which it worked - the atom. Stronger heads finally learned how to cope without this "remnant of earth," and perhaps one day people, including even the logicians, will also grow accustomed to cope without that little "it" (to which the honourable old "I" has reduced itself)." (Friedrich Nietzsche - Beyond Good and Evil, Part I - Aphorism #17) ^[3]

• A thought comes when it wishes, rather than when an “I” wills it. To say “I think” implies that “I” is the condition of thinking and this is not necessarily true. If there is a thought present, that does not necessarily imply that there is an “I.” The idea that there must be an “I” is merely an assumption rather than an “immediate certainty,” and the assumption is caused by “grammatical habits” which lead us to think that every action requires a doer. This can be compared to older metaphysical errors such as those in relation to the false belief some physicists held that there is always an atom behind force (?)
• If, in an attempt to correct this false wording, one chooses to replace “I think” with “it thinks,” this will create no resolution whatsoever. “It” is now the condition of thinking rather than “I,” though there is still an assumed condition of thinking.
• Perhaps just as one day physicists learned to dispense with the need to place an atom behind force, in a similar manner philosophers will one day cease to need to place an “I” behind thoughts.
• While this does not imply that there is certainly no self behind thoughts, it is equally as false to say that there is certainly a self, a metaphysical subject behind thoughts - the subject is inferred and not given - and so dispensing of the usage of the "I" will reflect this better.

[1] trans. Hallam: ... [S]entio, oportere, ut quid dubitatio, quid cogitatio, quid exsistentia sit antè sciamus, quàm de veritate hujus ratiocinii: dubito, ergo sum, vel, quod idem est, cogito, ergo sum: plane simus persuasi.

[2] trans. nietzsche.holtof.com

[3] trans. nietzsche.holtof.com

Reading List

• Friedrich Nietzsche - Beyond Good and Evil - Preface & Part One - https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4363/4363-h/4363-h.htm
• John Brady - The Persistent Effect: On Nietzsche’s attack on the Cogito, and its survival strategies - https://www.academia.edu/29316716/The_Persistent_Effect_On_Nietzsche_s_attack_on_the_Cogito_and_its_survival_strategies
• John Cottingham - The Cambridge Companion to Descartes - https://morphogenesisofsurface.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/the_cambridge_companion_to_descartes.pdf
• René Descartes - In Meditations on First Philosophy - Meditation I & II - https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/70091/pg70091-images.html
• John Cottingham - Descartes - Chapter 2 - ???
• Georges Dicker - Descartes: An Analytical And Historical Introduction - Chapter 1 & 2 - ???